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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 























































































































































































a. The role of institutions in an organization
b. Institutional essentials in a constitution
c. The starting point for institutional proposals in the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union
2. The institutional system of the EC
3. The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union
a. The ideological approach chosen by the authors
b. The proposed institutional structure
c. The decision-making system























































































































































































a. The role of institutions in an organization
Any organization needs institutions in order to determine, to 
express and to implement the intentions of the members of the 
organization. In political organizations, the institutions 
provided for by the constitution are the formalized structure 
through which the organization's overall power is exercised.(1) 
Institutions, their respective powers and their mutual relations 
are thus a necessary prerequisite of any organization.
Institutions also represent, like the tip of the iceberg, the 
visible part of the entity. The very existence of an organization 
depends on its capacity to remain "visible", to establish a 
reality for its constituent parts. Through their role in
embodying the character of an organization for its members, 
institutions generate and aggregate consent for the organization. 
Consent within an organization - legitimacy - presupposes an 
identification of its members with the organization. 
Identification (or "loyalty") can only be achieved when a minimum 
of stability exists within the institutional framework.
Hence institutions fulfill essentially three functions: 
they promote the efficiency of an organization by providing the 
tools necessary for the achievement of the organization's aims; 
they provide legitimacy for an organization through
V
participation of members of the organization in decision-making 




























































































they generate identity by intergrating social actors into the 
organization.
How these basic functions of an institutional system are 
fulfilled depends largely on the kind of institutions which a 
given constitution provides for and from the way in which 
cooperation and mutual control are built into the institutional 
structure. Although any institutional system serves the same set 
of basic functions, the operation of institutions cannot be 
separated from the aims for which they have been created. 
Institutions and aims are in fact related to each other through a 
dialectical process.
These observations are valid both for States and for 
international organizations. In this (formal) respect, any text 
which lays down the guidelines for the institutional system of an 
organization may be considered as a constitution.(2) Depending on 
the number and the stability of the proper values this dialectic 
process has generated for the institution, however, this text may 
also be considered a constitution in a substantive sense. The EC 
Treaties in a substantive sense are considered as either in a 
"process of constitutionalization",(3) or already as a
constitution,(4) depending on the number and the stability of the 
proper values this dialectic process has generated for the EC.
In the present EEC Treaty, Article 4 expressly relates aims 




























































































"The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried 
out by the following institutions..."
This means, on the one hand, that the institutions do not have any 
function outside the scope of the Treaty and, on the other hand 
that the tasks shall not be carried out by any institution other 
than those provided for in the Treaties. This intrinsic link 
between policies and institutions has to be kept in mind when 
submitting proposals either for reforms of policies or of 
institutions .
b. Institutional essentials in a constitution
On the assumption that a constitution is the formal framework 
for determining the aims of a political organization and providing 
the instruments for the achievement of those aims, a draft 
constitution has to provide for a minimum institutional structure. 
In theory, every new constitution has a free choice among possible 
institutions, but constitutional history shows that the variety of 
institutions tends to be limited and that one of the
characteristic features of institutions resides in their being 
designed in reply to previously existing institutions, either by 
developing certain features in order to make institutions more 
able to confront new tasks or by avoiding certain errors of past 
institutions.(5)
The complexity of modern institutional structures tend to 




























































































organizations, namely the State and international
organizations,(6) . The achievement of the traditional formal aims 
of such organizations (aggregating public opinion, and making, 
implementing and interpreting laws) entails a more or less complex 
institutional system, but in any event requires different 
specialised institutions. The "division of power" among several 
institutions permits a more specialised and therefore more 
efficient activity of the individual institution and limits at the 
same time its weight in comparison to other institutions. Any 
draft constitution has to assign the four traditional functions to 
institutions and has to determine, at least in principle, how 
those functions are to be exercised. It has, furthermore, to lay 
down rules for the establishment of the institutions, the 
procedure for the selection of office-holders and for the duration 
of their term of office. A further necessary set of rules 
concerns the relations among the institutions with respect to the 
execution of their respective tasks (e.g the question of judicial 
control). Finally, an institutional system must be provided with 
rules which create flexibility within and among the institutions 
and also for the entire institutional system. This flexibility is 
usually achieved through some level of institutional autonomy, 
either expressly, through the authorization to adopt Rules of 
Procedure and to create auxiliary institutions, or tacitly through 
the acceptance of the principle of "implied powers".
c. The starting point for institutional proposals in the Draft 




























































































The draft is not to be considered as a blueprint of an 
abstract "ideal" constitution for a European Union. The text has 
been designed as a constitution for an organization that comprises 
the members of the existing European Communities. It will not 
create an organization functionally separate from the EC but will 
be the result of an evolutionary process which has its origins in 
the present Treaties.(7) In this respect, the draft follows the 
same line of thought which has inspired proposals for a closer 
Union among Member States ever since the ECSC was established in 
1952,(8) although the first proposal, submitted in 1953, was 
inspired by more abstract considerations since it built on hardly 
any experience with the institutions of the ECSC that had shortly 
before been established.
Therefore, the 1984 draft bears all the signs of traditional 
constitution making: it aims at maintaining a maximum of stability 
in the existing institutional structure, and proposed 
modifications considered necessary due to a change in the 
priority of values. It would, of course, have been possible for 
Parliament to design a completely new and different institutional 
system, but it was probably easiest to maintain the known 
structures as long as no consensus for deviations from them could 
be found, thus making the possible change "calculable" for the 
MEPs. This approach also has its "external" justification: as 
pointed out in the introduction, institutions serve as 
identification marks of an organization. The more stable 




























































































towards the organization and its institutions. This is 
particularly significant in the present situation, since the 
loyalty of the Community citizens is one of the major shortcomings 
of existing institutions. It is certainly wise to base proposals 
for a "new" organization on the existing institutional structure.
On this basis, it is possible to identify three different 
currents of thought which influenced the institutional proposals 
in the draft:
i. According to Parliament the evolution of the institutional 
system of the EC Treaties requires major adjustments in order 
to increase its efficiency and its legitimacy(9);
ii. The new competences attributed to the Union in the draft 
imply a further transfer of competences from national 
Parliaments and would therefore require a parallel increase 
in parliamentary powers on the EC level(10);
iii. In order to promote the further process of integration, it
is necessary to strengthen the independence of the
organization from the Member States.(11)
These three factors could be characterized as Efficiency (i), 
Democracy (ii) and Independence (iii).
It seems appropriate to examine the institutional structure 




























































































institutions established by the EC Treaties and to take into 
account the specific aims of Parliament.(12)
2. The institutional system of the EC
Since the Merger Treaty of 1965, the EC Treaties(13) provide 
for four institutions, Assembly, Council, Commission and Court. 
An auxiliary institution, the Economic and Social Committee fills 
an advisory function in regard to the Commission and the Council 
within the framework of the EEC and Euratom Treaties. Another 
auxiliary institution was established by the Treaty of July 22, 
1975, which transformed the control committee into the Court of 
Auditors.(14) In addition, the institutions are surrounded by a 
large number of complementary entities with different legal 
nature.(15) Formally, the European Council, the Conference of 
Heads of State and Government, acts outside the institutional 
structure of the Treaties, but it can meet as a Council. The 
"Conference of the Representatives of the Member States", which is 
not an institution of the EC, but formally a type of inter­
governmental cooperation, often prepares or complements EC 
legislation.
This institutional system reflects concepts about legitimacy 
of power, of due process in law and of checks and balances. But 
it is not modelled on a specific constitution of a state or an 
international organization. Legislation and executive functions 




























































































Parliament fulfills codecision and control functions, and judicial 
control is exercised by the Court. The composition of the 
institutions aims essentially at legitimacy. Thus, all Member 
States are represented. Their size, determined with an eye to 
efficiency, depends on the tasks assigned to each. Enlargements 
of the EC have, therefore, led to an increase in size of the 
institutions.
The Treaties describe in an abstract way the powers of each 
institution,(16) but those enumerations are not sufficiently 
complete and precise to determine the role of each institution in 
decision-making. The different procedures for adopting 
legislative acts can only be inferred from the Treaty provisions 
providing for specific policies.
A particular feature of these procedures is the cooperation 
between several institutions required to adopt legislative acts. 
Within this cooperation, the Commission has the (formal) right of 
initiative and the task of preparing legislative acts, the Council 
has the legislative decision power and Parliament has the task of 
public discussion and of control over the Commission. This 
original system underwent considerable modifications in the form 
of Treaty amendments, unilateral decisions by institutions, and 
agreements among the institutions. The modifications strengthened 
the position of the Council to the detriment of the Commission and 
of Parliament. The institutional system, both in its original 




























































































to face increasing criticism of the efficiency, legitimacy and 
balance among the institutions.
The most pertinent of these criticisms can be summarized as 
follows(17) :
The institutions of the EC are still not considered by its own 
citizens as producing and guaranteeing solutions for vital 
problems.
The political options underlying decisions are hardly ever made 
public and are only indirectly subject to influence and 
control. Community citizens do not see themselves as
participants in the system. In other words, it lacks
representativeness. Together, the first two criticisms amount 
to a claim that the Community lacks legitimacy and, hence, has 
not attracted the loyalty of its citizens.
The efficiency of the system when producing decisions is 
doubtful. Furthermore, decisions often are not taken according 
to a proper common interest but rather according to the 
smallest common denominator.
To a large extent similar criticisms are made within States. 
But within the EC the system. Three main amplifying factors can 
be identified;
the incomplete legal framework governing relations between the 
institutions,




























































































the position of Parliament, which differs from that in national 
constitutions.
Especially the dynamic conception of the Treaties, which 
applies both to policies and to institutions, has repeatedly 
encouraged the institutions to question their present position. 
As early as 1962, and from then on in regular intervals, 
Parliament has submitted proposals for a substantial increase in 
its own powers. But these proposals were designed as 
modifications within the present Treaty structure.(18)
Although these proposals were dealt with separately from the 
preparation of a proposal for the European Union, their underlying 
philosophy with regard to institutions and decision-making is 
similar. The prevailing aim is the strengthening of the 
parliamentary and Community elements against the influence of 
national governments on the EC system.
3. The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union
a. The ideological background
The institutions and the decision-making process occupy a 
central position in the approach chosen by the European Parliament 
towards European Union. Their key role is apparent for the fact 
that the relevant articles(19) cover more than one third of the 
entire Draft Treaty. This formal element reflects not only 




























































































also Parliament's central concern with the failures of the 
existing system. Parliament, in fact, expressly decided in 1982 
"to maintain the institutional structure of the Community and to 
adjust it so that defaults are abolished and the Union on the 
other hand gets the possibility of executing new tasks".(20) 
Altiero Spinelli has given six reasons for the initiative for a 
European Union, all of which are related to the malfunctioning of 
the present institutional system of the Communities.(21) In fact, 
Parliament seems to consider the draft essentially an instrument 
to repair defects of the existing institutional system. This 
approach is radically different from the one displayed, for 
example, in the proposals for an economic and monetary union,(22) 
where institutional changes were considered as an annex to an 
enlargement of EC competences. Similarly, the Tindemans Report of 
1975 on the European Union suggested minor institutional 
improvements only as a consequence of substantive reforms.(23) 
One might object to Parliament's approach, that an agreement on 
institutions and procedures for the solution of future problems 
distracts from the necessary agreement on the substance of those 
problems. But experience shows that a well designed institutional 
sub-system, like the Court of Justice, may have a larger impact on 
the evolution of European Union than discussions on the substance 
of policies that remain hypothetical because of a defective 
institutional system.(24)
A further objection which might be raised against the method 




























































































Draft. The institutional parts of the text are heavily 
conditioned by the present Treaty structure, Parliament tries to 
"repair" rather than to "invent". One might be disappointed to 
see a new adventure like the European Union result from the ruins 
of the present Treaties. Continuity is of course the safest way 
of avoiding major errors and of reassuring the political 
opponents, thus a defendable way to increase "acceptance". But 
the stability of the political system, which this approach 
implies, is in the light of strong negative opinion on the EC only 
a relative constitutional value.
One might, therefore, regret that the requirements of an 
institutional system for the Union, even in the context of the 
present Treaties, have not been further explored. Such an 
analysis could have tried to establish a relationship between the 
competences of the Union and the necessary instruments for their 
implementation. Another approach could have been to evaluate 
critically the potential of efficiency, legitimacy and flexibility 
in the present institutional system and to try to submit 
suggestions for increasing this potential. This might have led to 
questions such as:
are the present institutions sufficiently representative for 
the people of the Union? Would, for example, a regional 
representation or a representation of national Parliaments 
(like in the Draft of 1953) not be necessary? Would size, 





























































































The main aim of Parliament's draft obviously is to extend its 
own powers within the present institutional framework. One might 
well ask whether this step is not at the same time too large 
(because it shifts legislative authority from Council to 
Parliament) and too small (because it does not substantially 
increase the overall legitimacy of the institutional system).
b. The proposed institutional structure(25)
The institutional structure proposed for the Union 
hardly differs from that existing under the present Treaties. In 
fact, Article 8 of the draft differs in substance from Article 4, 
par. 1 of the EEC Treaty only in adding the European Council to 
the institutions of the future Union. Parliament seems to have 
included it somewhat reluctantly, since the European Council is 
placed at the very end of the list, which otherwise follows the 
order as established by Article 4 (EEC).
In any event, it should be borne in mind that the European 
Council, although of highly symbolic value, is an emanation of 
national Governments. Its formal establishment and bestowment 
with specific powers implies a major transfer of powers from 
national Parliaments to their respective Governments. This is 
particularly obvious for the power of the European Council to 
establish a Union competence in the field of defence policy. 




























































































likely to increase and might, in fact, create an obstacle to the 
ratification of the draft.
In the Union, the European Parliament and the European 
Council will be - as they tend already to be under the existing 
Treaties - the two poles of inter-institutional rivalry and 
tension. Both will claim a maximum of autonomous legitimacy. It 
is doubtful whether the system proposed for the Union is 
sufficiently sophisticated to balance those tensions. One 
possibility could have consisted in strengthening Parliament by 
creating a "Senate" in which national Parliaments were 
represented. This solution was, in fact, proposed in 1953.(26) 
Another method could have been to integrate fully the European 
Council into the institutional system. But the Draft's silence 
about the possibility of trusting constitutional conflicts between 
the European Council and the Parliament to the Court, and 
Parliament's reluctance to provide for rules of procedure of the 
European Council(27) indicate that Parliament seems to accept that 
the European Council enjoys, like a monarch, a particular
autonomy. Under the present Treaties, the legal powers of the 
European Council do not differ from those of the Council. The 
draft assigns to it the power to decide new areas of Community 
competences (Arts. 54, 68). This innovation creates, in fact, a 
Treaty amendment procedure which one might locate between Articles 





























































































With three exceptions, the proposed text on Parliament 
confirms the institutional position it has acquired within the EC 
Treaties. In particular, its composition and the term of office 
are not modified. The three new features concern its powers:
its consultative function is transformed into participation in 
legislation and in the adoption of the budget;
it approves the appointment of the Commission and it 
participates in the nomination of the members of the Court and 
the Court of Auditors (although this elective function is not 
mentioned in Article 16 of the draft, which lists the powers of 
Parliament);
finally, a new element is the recognition of a power to conduct 
enquiries and to receive petitions. The really important 
question of the legal powers Parliament has for this purpose, 
however, is left to organic laws (Art. 18).
The institutional position of the Council is visibly reduced 
in respect to its legislative powers. According to Article 21, 
the Council participates in the legislative and budgetary 
procedure.(28) In its composition, the Parliament seems to adopt 
the idea of "European ministers". Article 20 of the draft 
provides that each representation "shall be led by a minister who 
is permanently and specifically responsible for Union affairs". 
This formula looks like an interference into the autonomy of 
national Governments. It is in fact difficult to imagine that the 




























































































who is designated on an ad hoc basis by the Head of State or the 
national Government.
One indication of the above mentioned "reactive" character of 
the draft can be found in Article 24, where it is stated that 
Council's rules of procedure shall provide for publicity of 
meetings in which the Council acts as a legislative or budgetary 
authority. For itself Parliament did not consider such a rule 
necessary. In any event, its application would require 
substantial changes in the Council’s internal rules and perhaps in 
its habits, although the confidentiality of Council meetings at 
present is often pure fiction.
Contrary to Article 5 of the Merger Treaty, combined with 
Article 148, par. I (EEC), the Draft provides that the Council's 
rules of procedure shall be adopted by an absolute majority. 
Although this wording establishes a parallel between Parliament 
and Council, the notion "absolute majority" is defined differently 
for the Council (combined majority of weighted votes and of a 
number of representations)(29) and for Parliament (majority of 
members).(30)
The new way of counting majorities in Council renders routine 
decisions easier, because a simple majority is also obtained from 
weighted votes, thus enabling the four "big" countries to 




























































































require an "absolute" majority are more difficult to take 
(provided that votes are taken at all).
With respect to the Commission it should be noted that the 
draft establishes a link between its terms of office and the term 
of Parliament, thus prolonging the present four year period to 
five years and underlining at the same time the political 
responsibility of the Commission towards Parliament.
With regard to its appointment, the draft provides for a 
somewhat awkward procedure (Art. 25, 16). Its president is 
appointed by the European Council (this appointment meaning at the 
same time cooption to the European Council), the president then 
selects the other members of the Commission. Finally, the 
Commission obtains "investiture" from Parliament. The legal 
consequences of failure to obtain this investiture are not 
indicated. If there are none, then this procedure comes very 
close to the present selection system where Parliament has de 
facto no influence on the choice of members of the Commission, 
since the Governments are eager to preserve their prerogative in 
this respect.
Parliament's underlying assumption is that the President of 
the Commission, whose authority originates from the European 
Council, would seek an understanding with Parliament on the choice 




























































































Council will hardly appoint somebody President of the Commission 
who has not committed himself to a certain team.
With respect to the Court and to the Court of Auditors, the 
draft provides for appointment of some of its members by 
Parliament and by Council (Arts. 30,33). This technique is likely 
to create conflicts among the appointing institutions, e.£. on the 
methods for providing for a representation of all Member States in 
those institutions. It would be safer to provide for a mechanism 
which guarantees that decisions on appointments are taken in due 
course before the end of the term of the outgoing member.
The Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee 
shall no longer enjoy the privileged status conferred upon them by 
Article 4, pars. II and III (EEC) where they are mentioned 
together with the main institutions. Together with the Investment 
Bank and the Monetary Fund they are now named "organs" and listed 
in Article 33. Apart from this more politically(32) relevant 
reduction in status, the terminology used in Article 33 will 
contribute to further confusion: In the English versions those 
entities are called "organs", whilst the German version uses the 
term "Einrichtungen". Until now the notion of "Organ" was used in 
the German version of the Treaties for the main institutions 
(Parliament, Council, Commission, Court). It is difficult to see 
why the Draft did not use any internationally recognized 




























































































United Nations, in order to call its entities in as meaningful and 
least confusing a way as possible.
In its provision for the rules of procedure of the Court of 
Auditors, the draft repeats the omission of the EEC Treaty by 
failing clearly to lay down the autonomy of the Court in this 
respect.(33)
For the Economic and Social Committee, on the other hand, the 
autonomy to adopt its own rules of procedure has been recognized 
and is, contrary to the EEC Treaty (Art. 196, par. II) no longer 
subject to the approval of the Council. Furthermore, a right of 
initiative is formally conferred upon ECOSOC (Art. 33, par. 
3) .(34)
The system of "organs" may be supplemented by the Union 
itself by means of an organic law (Art. 33, par. 5), thus 
enabling the institutional structure of the Union to grow and to 
differentiate according to future requirements. This last proviso 
in the chapter dealing with institutions and organs highlights a 
particular dimension of the draft: The large number of references 
to organic laws which shall lay down further details, coupled with 
general clauses such as that providing for new organs would 





























































































c . The decision-making system
It should first be noted that decision-making also includes 
the budgetary procedure, that is to say the procedure to be 
followed for the adoption of the budget. The Draft Treaty in 
Article 76 has - as do the existing Treaties (Art. 203 (EEC)) - 
completely separated the legislative procedure from the budgetary 
procedure(35). I wonder whether this separation is necessary. It 
might have been useful, in fact, to combine the two procedures. 
As experience shows, legislation and adopting the budget are two 
faces of the same coin. To ignore this identity is in fact the 
easiest method to create conflicts among the institutions - and 
even within the institutions - (Budgetary Council v. Foreign 
Ministers; Budgetary Committee v. Agricultural Committee). No 
solution is provided for this kind of conflict.
The objection is not a formality. According to Article 38, 
par. 4, legislation may be adopted after the conciliation 
procedure by a simple majority of members composing Parliament. 
But the adoption of budget items which the Council has modified 
requires a qualified majority in Parliament according to Article 
76 et seq.. If Parliament, against opposition from the Council, 
has adopted legislation which established financial obligations, 
and if Council maintains its opposition in the budgetary 
procedure, it may well occur that Parliament is not able to put 




























































































it has decided by itself. I wonder whether this result was 
intended by Parliament.
Legislative procedure is entrusted by core Articles 36 and 38 
to Parliament and Council which emerge as the joint legislative 
authority.
The idea of co-decision is already achieved under the present 
Treaties in the budgetary field and it was proposed for 
legislation in the "Vedel Report" of 1972. Parliament suggests 
now that codecision applies to the initiative and to the 
decisional phase as well. Legislation is generally initiated by 
the Commission. But both Parliament and Council may, if the 
Commission refuses, introduce legislation by themselves. This 
procedure (Art. 37) is not quite clear. It seems as if only the 
institution which previously invited the Commission to act, may 
introduce draft legislation (Parliament or Council, not Parliament 
and Council). Furthermore, it is not clear what is meant by 
"refuses". Does this imply that a draft text has to be submitted 
within a certain time limit before Parliament or Council may act 
by themselves? Can the Commission implicitly reject?
In any event, once the legislative procedure has started, a 
bill may be enacted after Council and Parliament had the 
possibility to amend it and after at least one institution has 
approved it. The Council may reject draft legislation with 




























































































majority for rejection within a given time limit, Parliament alone 
may enact the bill. This is an ingenious proposal which could 
bring forward two major achievements:
a participation of Parliament in legislation and 
a way around the notorious lack of capability of the Council to 
gather a "positive" majority for the adoption of a text.
The procedure on the other hand establishes all necessary 
safeguards against legislation which is contrary to the will of a 
vast majority of governments. It even provides a safeguard for 
individual governments by giving a formal blessing to the 
"Luxembourg Compromise" of 1966 (Art. 23, 3). Unfortunately it is 
not clear beyond doubt whether a government should be allowed to 
block a vote in Council even beyond the time limit in Article 38 
or whether this right can be exercised only within this limit.
It is obvious that this decision-making process would
increase the legitimacy of the Union, since it would ensure the 
participation of Parliament. It would facilitate decisions and it 
would provide for safeguards of individual states' interests. On 
the other hand, it might be argued that the decision-making 
process would become more complex and could thus lose in
efficiency. This danger, however, seems marginal taking into 
account the time constraints put on each institution (which for 
certain legislative projects might be too short but could be 
prolonged on actual agreement). In comparison to the present 




























































































keystone for any further development of the present Treaties, 
since it would enable the Union to overcome the present inertia.
But attention must be drawn to the somewhat doubtful proposal 
contained in Article 38, par. 5 of the Draft. According to this 
paragraph, decisions may come into effect even if no vote has 
taken place in the Parliament or Council. The lack of legitimacy 
of decisions adopted according to this procedure, in my opinion is 
too large in comparison to the gain in efficiency of the decision­
making procedure. It is not compensated by the fact that, in any 
event, the two other institutions have to approve a text. It is 
hardly acceptable that the consent of directly elected Parliament 
is reputed by the absence of a vote within a given time.
d. Possible repercussions of the Draft on the existing Treaties
Parliament has carefully kept separate its proposals on 
institutional reforms within the framework of the existing 
Treaties(35) from the proposed institutional system under a new 
Treaty. But this separation is somewhat artificial since the 
institutions devised for the European Union for their largest part 
remain identical to those under the present Treaties. This close 
relationship provides the advantage that the solutions which were 
found for given problems of the Union could be used in the context 
of the EC Treaties. This should in itself be considered as a 




























































































In fact, the decision-making procedure as it is proposed, 
namely in Article 38, could become part of the present Treaties 
separately from the remaining text of the Draft. Obviously a 
treaty revision in accordance with Article 236 would be necessary, 
but technically it would be possible, even without too many 
changes in the Treaty - and it would establish a substantial 
improvement. Therefore, it might be worthwhile considering the 
alternative to a reform in the decision-making process without 
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meaning given to it by Article 4 of the EEC Treaty. It should 
be kept in mind that the German version of the Treaty uses the 
more specific term "Organe". This notion is familiar to the 
English reader as well. Cf_. Article 7 of the UN Charter
("Principal Organs").
2. Bernhardt, Sources of Community Law, in Thirty Years of EC Law 
77 (Commission of the EC, ed. 19Ô1) .
3. Weiler, The Community System; The Dual Character of
Supranationalism, in Yearbook of European L., 267 et seq.(292) 
(Jacobs, ed. 1981) .
4. Schwarze, Verfassungsentwicklung____ in der Europ&ischen
Gemeinschaft, in Erne Verfassung fhr Europa 15 (23) (Schwarze, 
Bieber, eds. 1984).
5. C£. Mill, Stuart, Utalitarianism, Liberty, Representative 
Government, 175 et seq. (1910 (1972)). For recent examples 
see Debré, Les idées constitutionnelles du Général de Gaulle,
(1974) (for the Constitution ôf the V Republic). On the 
origins of the German Grundgesetz, £f. Hesse, Das Grundgesetz 
in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, xn,
Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts 3-27 (Maihofer, Vogel, eds., 
1983) .
6. Most international organizations have a structure that is less
complex than the structure of states, but the same trends 
towards complexity can be observed. Also the different aims 
lead to partly different institutions. For details see
Schermers, International Institutional Law, Vol. I (1972), and
Seidl-Hohenveldern , Das____Recht____der___ internationalen
Organisâtionen____ einschliesslich der supranationalen
Gemeinschaf ten~j 9 (4 th ed., 1984 ) .




























































































8. For details see Bieber, Verfassungsentwicklung in der 
Europ&ischen Gemeinschaft, Formen und Verfahren, in Eine 
Verfassung für Europa 49-Ô9 (Schwarze, Bieber, eds., 19ÏÏ4).
9. This opinion is not limited to Parliament, see for example The 
Report on European Institutions, presented by the Committee of 
the Three to the European Council (1979), and the Vedel 
Report, EC Bulletin, Suppl. No. 4/1972.
10. This line of thought was already presented in the proposals 
for an economic and monetary union ( "Werner Plan” ), i.n EC 
Bulletin, Suppl. No. 11/1970, see also the report of experts 
on the economic and monetary union ("Marjolin Report") of 
1975, Chapter IV.1.
11. This view can already be found in the EP Resolution of 10 July 
1975 preceding the Tindemans Report, 23 O,J. No. C 179/1975.
12. For details of Parliament's intentions, see Explanatory 
Statement, in Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
(Doc. I-575753/C, draftsman Mr. Zecchino).
13. Art. 4 EEC, Art. 3 Euratom, Art. 7 ECSC.
14. Art. 4, III and Art. 206 EEC Treaty.
15. For a detailed analysis see Hilf, Die Organisationsstruktur 
der Europâischen Gemeinschaften, (1982).
16. Parliament, Art. 137; Council, Art. 145; Commission,,Art. 
155; Court, Art. 164; ECOSOC, Art. 193; Court of Auditors, 
Art. 206 EEC Treaty.
17. See analysis in the Report of the Three Wise Men, op. cit. 
Tnote 10 ) .
18. Cf. in particular the reports submitted in 1981/82 on 
relations with Council, Commission and European Council, on 
the conclusion of international agreements and on Political 
Cooperation. For details see Le Parlement Européen, 143 et 
seg. (Jacqué, Bieber, Constantinesco, Nickel, 1984).
19. Arts. 8, 14-44, 75, 76, 78-81.
20. O.J. No. C 238/1982, 25.
21. Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, Spinelli (European University 
Institute, 19 83); cf. also Spinelli, iii Eine Verfassung für 
Europa 231.
22. See supra note 10.




























































































24. Cf. Weiler, op. cit., note 3, supra.
25. For the Court of Justice, see Chapter by Judge Koopmans.
26. Cf. Art. 11 of the Draft Statute, submitted by the ad hoc 
assembly on March 10, 1953.
27. CJE. Art. 32, par. 2 of the Draft.
28. Cf. Art. 145 EEC Treaty "... have power to take decisions."
29. Art. 23, par. II of the Draft.
30. Art. 17, par. II of the Draft.
31. Note the difference from Art. 148, par. I, EEC Treaty 
"majority of its members".
32. Although it is significant for Parliament's narrow concept of 
respresentativity.
33. This might already have been recognised by the heads of state 
and government in 1972, cf. Final Communiqué of October 20, 
1972 .
34. For a detailed analysis of the budgetary part of the Draft, 
cf. the Chapter by Mr. 0rstr0m Miller.
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